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The proliferation of SALW makes violence more deadly. BICC conducted a 
 project in Sudan and the sub-region with a special focus on strengthening 
co-operation on SALW control and cross-border co-operation.
A soldier from the Joint Sudan–Chad Border Patrol Force keeps watch from  
on top of a Land Cruiser while on patrol in Bir Saliba, West Darfur.
SUMMARY
On the occasion of its 20th anniversary, the Bonn International Center for 
Conversion (BICC) hosted a two-day international academic conference on 
“Facing Organised Violence: Research Agendas and Conversion Potentials” 
from 27 to 28 October 2014 in Bonn. The aim of the conference was to approach 
current dynamics of organised violence from a critical angle. Speakers and 
panellists focussed on concepts, means, and practices of organised violence. 
“Concepts” were reflected as discourses that legitimise the use of violence, 
such as security policies or military strategies. The panels about “means” 
referred to the tools and material infrastructure of organised violence, such as 
the arms industry and conventional weapons (in particular small arms and 
light weapons—SALW). Visible patterns of behaviour such as rules, norms, and 
types of actors were investigated in the “practices” section. Building on these 
three dimensions, the conference discussed “natural resources” and “migration” 
as two intersecting themes touching organised violence in societal contexts.
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The audience listening to the video keynote by Carolyn R. Nordstrom, University of Notre Dame, Indiana
BICC \ KNOWLEDGE NOTES � \ ���� 5 \
FACING ORGANISED VIOLENCE \ ELVAN ISIKOZLU, SUSANNE HEINKE (Eds.)
PREFACE
We can no longer blind out organised violence in the 
crisis-hit regions of the world nor the questions and 
problems connected with it. Even if we turn off televi-
sion, stop reading newspaper and ignore Internet 
postings: Global conflicts are still even then reflected 
on our own streets. A global domestic policy as called 
for by Willy Brandt over 30 years ago serves not only 
the interests of peace in the crisis-hit regions of this 
world, but also peaceful co-existence here in Germa-
ny. Apart from which, as one of the world’s economi-
cally strongest industrial nations we have a global 
 responsibility.
As a major industrial region in the heart of Europe, 
North Rhine-Westphalia has close links and econom-
ic relations to the entire world. Each war and each in-
ternational crisis endangers this network. That is why 
a world at peace must be of interest to us as well, apart 
from the humanitarian aspect. In addition, the crises 
across the globe are topics which move people. They 
 expect guidance—and they are right to do so. As a key 
location for science and research with the highest 
density of universities and research institutions in 
Europe, we have the potential in North Rhine- West-
phalia to make an appropriate contribution through 
an interdisciplinary and practice-oriented approach.
Part of this potential is also the Bonn International 
Center for Conversion. Founded in 1994 on the initia-
tive of Johannes Rau, it has been celebrating its twen-
tieth birthday in 2014. BICC is today one of the top ad-
dresses for peace and conflict research in Germany. 
Conversion research, which is illustrated by the con-
ference with the title of "Facing Organised Violence: 
Research Agendas and Conversion Potentials", 
stretches a conceptual framework within which top-
ics are investigated and correlated with each other. 
They range from the question of future and presence 
of war to the mobilisation and demobilisation of 
combatants, control of small arms as well as 
cross-cutting themes such as natural resources and 
migration to classic conversion topics. Structural 
transformation processes in military facilities and  
in the armaments industry, for example, are topical 
issues now as before. 
We have outstanding researchers and scientists in 
this field in North Rhine-Westphalia. This undoubt-
edly also includes the BICC staff in Bonn. With its 
high-level, application-oriented and transdisciplinary 
research, it is a valuable enrichment for our federal 
state’s research landscape. In Bonn, this international 
UN location with the United Nations University, the 
Center for Development Research and the German 
Development Institute—to name but a few—BICC 
finds itself in a synergetic environment in which it is 
contributing to the investigation of major global is-
sues. Its findings are in demand both at national and 
inter national level. In the past years, it has numbered 
amongst the top 100 worldwide in the Global Think 
Tank Ranking.
I would like to thank you most sincerely, Professor 
Schetter, as well as your entire team for this tremen-
dous commitment. Together with BICC, you are all  
a great enrichment for Bonn as an international sci-
ence and research location and an enrichment for 
North Rhine-Westphalia.
Svenja Schulze \  
Minister for Innovation, Science and Research of the State  
of North Rhine-Westphalia
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FOREWORD
BICCs vision is a more peaceful world! 
BICC celebrated its 20th anniversary with an academ-
ic conference at the Uniclub and the Festsaal of the 
University of Bonn, from 27 to 28 October 2014. Over 
the course of the two days, more than 120 interna-
tional researchers from different academic back-
grounds debated different patterns of “organised vio-
lence” and how BICC can engage with this topic in 
the coming future. 
Organised Violence
The theme of this conference, “organised violence”,  
is the new overarching topic of BICC’s 2014 to 2018 
 research agenda and the focus for studying “conver-
sion.” We chose this topic for several reasons.
First, research and policy realise that the complex 
puzzle of violent conflicts can no longer be under-
stood by applying a hermetic grid of definitions and 
differentiations: We are hardly able to differentiate 
clearly between “war” and “peace”, between “inter-
state wars” and “civil wars” or other kinds of bipolar 
ascriptions. One can even question whether we have 
ever been able to differentiate one from the other. 
What is more, every attempt in the last two decades 
to define conflict dynamics with labels such as “new 
wars” or “fragile/ failed states”, or recently “ungov-
erned spaces”, fails to include contradicting trends, 
such as the continuing existence of conventional 
forms of warfare: The war between Russia and Geor-
gia in 2008, the current situation of hybrid warfare in 
the Donbass in Eastern Ukraine or the repeated 
sabre- rattling between China and Japan, India and 
Pakistan or Thailand and Cambodia in recent years. 
These conflicts show that the time of military con-
frontation between nation states is not over. On the 
contrary: We can observe the multiplicity of diverg-
ing patterns of organised violence today. 
Second, the complexity of war and the direct involve-
ment of many different actors in war have become 
more and more obvious. Refugee movements, com-
modity chains or the exploration of extractive re-
sources such as gold, oil and diamonds show that 
wars—even if they are located somewhere at the 
fringes of the modern world—have a direct impact on 
our daily life and make us part of such conflicts. For 
example, the ongoing war in Syria and Iraq illustrates 
how organised violence has a direct impact on our so-
ciety and vice versa:
 \ We witness that thousands of Jihadists from 
Europe and the United States are fighting side 
by side with militants of so-called Islamic 
State. This has stimulated a public debate about 
what has gone wrong with social integration in 
Western societies. Why are citizens attracted  
to participate in war and celebrate extreme 
 violence?
 \ The mass flight of refugees from Syria has be-
come a pressing theme for national and local 
politics across Europe. The phenomenon of ref-
ugees is not an abstract one. Society and poli-
tics have to find quick solutions for providing 
support.
 \ We have to keep in mind that over the last de-
cades Western arms industries have exported 
military equipment to the Middle East, which 
today are used for warfare. Western govern-
ments share a responsibility for the creation of 
the most militarised region in the world—as 
shown by the latest data of BICC’s annual  Global 
Militarisation Index.
The complexity of wars does not only mean that we 
are facing the externalities of war and organised vio-
lence in our daily lives, but that we can no longer dis-
tance ourselves from such wars.
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Third, we find blunt acts of violence disturbing and 
shocking when they appear in real life. Our society 
eclipses violence from real life, but tends to experience 
and even enjoy violence in virtual life: In our high-
tech world social media, computer games, movies and 
videos have become the modern platforms, not to say 
battlefields, of heroic warfare. Physical violence dis-
appears in our real life. It becomes stigmatised.
However, if physical violence and warfare appear, the 
Western public tends to frame such phenomena in 
terms of a cultural-religious othering. On the one 
hand, we see the disturbing pictures of the behead-
ings of hostages or stoning of women in Syria and 
Iraq, posted on social networks. Here the tendency of 
the public is to connect such forms of violence direct-
ly with the religion of Islam—neglecting the atroci-
ties inflicted in the name of Christianity, the modern 
nation states or racism in the 20th century. On the 
other hand, we still believe in the supremacy of West-
ern modernity, which is for example expressed in the 
continuous improvement of modern warfare: for 
 example, “surgical” interventions and the use of the 
latest technology make us believe that only the “real 
evil” is targeted and that collateral or civil damage 
can be minimised. In imagining that it is possible to 
limit violence and human casualties to a very large 
extent, we have the impression that Western civiliza-
tion is able to humanise or to civilise war, while IS 
represents the barbaric side of violence.
Summing up these three examples, BICC under-
stands “organised violence” as a challenging and 
pressing topic due to 
 \ the academically limited ability to cope and 
categorise organised violence, 
 \ the un-bounding and complex nature of the 
subject, which influences our daily lives, and 
 \ the way in which violence is framed by value 
and norm systems. 
Conrad Schetter \ Director for Research BICC
Two Decades of Conversion Studies
Selecting the theme of “organised violence” also gives 
us the opportunity to reflect on the road BICC has 
travelled over the last 20 years. BICC is a unique insti-
tute at the crossroads between research and policy 
and technical advice. The institute integrates applied 
and policy-relevant research with concrete knowl-
edge exchange with policymakers, practitioners and 
the public. This is what we call the “knowledge circle.” 
BICC was established by the state of North Rhine- 
Westphalia in 1994 and is the only institute world-
wide with the term “conversion” in its title. At that 
time the main challenge was to cope with the over-
whelming military surplus of the times of the Cold 
War: Bases, arms depots, nuclear, chemical and con-
ventional weapons had to be converted or destroyed 
not only in Europe and Russia, but also across the 
world. Other questions were the demobilisation and 
reintegration of military staff, and the conversion of 
arms industries and military research. BICC quickly 
became the spearhead of conversion research. BICC’s 
Conversion Survey, published between 1995 and 2005, 
was then one of the most prominent sources for Con-
version Studies.
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While these themes are still high on BICC’s current 
research agenda, our understanding of conversion 
has changed. Today, BICC understands Conversion 
Studies as the reflective and policy-relevant engage-
ment with the dynamics of organised violence. 
 Organised violence manifests itself both in armed 
conflicts themselves as well as in the preparation for 
them. This is why Conversion Studies at BICC does 
not only focus on the conversion of military to civil-
ian means, but includes a wide range of themes such 
as discourses of war, civil–military relations, the pro-
duction, trade, control and destruction of small arms 
and light weapons as well as the mobilisation and de-
mobilisation of combatants, not to mention direct 
acts of violence.
This broadening of the BICC perspective links pres-
ent Conversion Studies with its past tradition, which 
focussed strongly on the military, military industry 
and public defence budgets. At the same time, this 
understanding aims to overcome the two main short-
comings of the classical understanding of conversion. 
These were 
 \ the domination of mono-causal pre-assump-
tions and 
 \ the understanding of the transformation from 
military to civil as a linear process.
In a nutshell, BICC defines conversion as any change 
of organised violence that responds to the problem 
that it poses to society as a whole. This definition em-
phasises the embeddedness of organised violence in 
social contexts. From this point of view, Conversion 
Studies draws attention to the ways in which organ-
ised violence translates into: a) concepts, b) means, 
and c) practices. These three perspectives are inter-
woven with each other. No single one can be investi-
gated without considering the other. For the sake of 
research, the separation into these three perspectives 
is beneficial as different objectives, theories, methods 
and approaches come to the fore. 
Concepts, Means, and Practices
Against this background it is no wonder that the con-
ference programme’s structure was based on our new 
Concept Paper and on the three perspectives that we 
elaborated in there.
“Concepts” address any attempt that seeks to either 
legitimate or de-legitimate expressions of organised 
violence, whether this relates to the build-up or reduc-
tion of military forces or to the actual use of physical 
force. A conceptual approach arises from a considera-
tion of discourses. The first session on “ Discourses of 
War” discussed current interpretations of war and 
the—often concealed—world views and belief sys-
tems these interpretations are based on. Although 
“going to war” is delegitimised in public discourses  
Michael Dedek (l.) \ Director for Administration BICC
Conference venue: Universitätsclub, Bonn
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or is seen as the ultima ratio, one might provocatively 
ask if—on the conceptual level—wars are not utterly 
needed to appreciate the absence of war.
The second session discussed “Means of Organised 
Violence.” “Means” refers to instruments and material 
infrastructure of organised violence—such as defence 
industries, battle tanks and aircraft carriers, small 
arms and light weapons or military bases. Our start-
ing-point of research is the physical artefact. We split 
this session into two panels, one on “Small Arms and 
Light Weapons” and one on “The Arms Industry.” The 
first panel on “Small Arms and Light Weapons” dis-
cussed possible ways ahead for improving arms con-
trol. One important question was whether the timing, 
the concepts as well as the stated and unstated goals 
of arms control and DDR were indeed the right ones. 
In the parallel panel “The Arms Industry” we reflect-
ed on the recent public and heated debate on the 
need for a defence industry—and under which condi-
tions—in Germany and in the European Union.
The “Practices of Organised Violence” include the for-
mulation of normative rules and the constitution of 
different actor-types. “Practices” can relate to strategies 
of mobilisation and demobilisation as much as to ac-
tual acts of violence themselves such as rape, homi-
cide or torture. In the panel discussion we addressed 
several regions of conflict—from the Balkans via 
Western Africa and the Horn of Africa to Afghanistan. 
We discussed different aspects of practices, ranging 
from the production of knowledge to the question of 
the internal and external mobilisation of militias. 
The central debate was the crucial role think tanks 
are playing for producing certain narratives about 
conflicts. This critical debate about the self-under-
standing of think tanks was highly welcome because 
it gave us the chance at BICC to reflect on our own role 
between research and policy- and technical advice.
Besides concepts, means and practices, BICC has 
identified two intersecting research topics for its fu-
ture research: “Natural Resources” and “Migration.” 
Both are highly relevant themes in international pol-
itics, which are strongly influenced and shaped by 
different patterns of organised violence. Both topics 
were addressed in the last session of the conference. 
Benedikt Korf discussed the relationship between cli-
mate change and civil wars and argued that direct 
linkages are promoted by research, but empirically 
hard to find. Paula Banerjee focussed on the interface 
of migration and violence in the Indo–Bangladesh 
border region. 
While this conference was not be able to answer all of 
the questions that were raised, it gave us at BICC the 
occasion to gain a few new insights and, much more 
importantly, some new puzzling questions. And final-
ly it was the event for celebrating the 20th anniversa-
ry of BICC.
I believe that this occasion merits a heartfelt “Thank 
You” to the State government of North Rhine-West-
phalia not only for having had the vision in 1994 to 
establish with BICC an international peace and con-
flict research institute but also for its unwavering 
support through core funding since then.
BICC would also like to thank all contributors to this 
conference as well as the kind support by the Spar-
kassen Stiftung, the America House in Düsseldorf, the 
Rector of the University of Bonn and the Uniclub.
Participants in a lively discussion
10 \ BICC \ KNOWLEDGE NOTES � \ ����
FACING ORGANISED VIOLENCE \ ELVAN ISIKOZLU, SUSANNE HEINKE (Eds.)
Concepts of Organised Violence— 
Discourses of War
How is organised violence legitimised or delegitimised in discourse? How can 
researchers critically engage with these discourses? And to what end? These 
questions were considered by Marc von Boemcken, BICC, Claudia Aradau, King’s 
College London, and Kai Koddenbrock, RWTH Aachen University, in a  challenging 
and provocative opening panel, moderated by Luuk van de Vondervoort, BICC.
Marc von Boemcken (l.) \ presented the paper “War: The First Casualty of Truth”
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There is No Single Truth of War 
Marc von Boemcken, BICC, identified three discours-
es of how war is conceptualised and thus legitimised 
in the West: war as the collapse of the political, war 
as the truth of the political, and war as the rational 
instrument of an independent political will. Each le-
gitimisation is a contradiction of the other, revealing 
that there is no single authoritative “truth” of war or 
organised violence. Any attempt to tell only one of 
these truths is therefore bound to omit some of the 
significance of war. In an argument built on insights 
from Foucault, von Boemcken characterised these dif-
ferent discursive formations in ideal-types, working 
out their theoretical and political underpinnings as 
well as their various expressions in contemporary 
conflict settings.
The first discourse, which conceptualises war as the 
collapse of the political, assumes the existence of a 
universal order of peace and a nexus of truth and 
peace. Here, war results from a breakdown of this or-
der, and thus is not part of “good society.” The second 
discourse, war as the truth of the political, is directly 
opposed to this, because war is placed at the centre of 
all social relations, constituting politics as the con-
tinuation of an everlasting war where truth can only 
be spoken from a position in the battlefield with 
clearly defined antagonists. The third discourse—war 
as the rational instrument of an independent politi-
cal will—sits somewhere in-between. It assumes that 
war can be “tamed” insofar as its performance can at 
least partially be subjected to a sovereign human in-
tention. 
Although all three discourses can be found next to 
each other in contemporary discussions and debates, 
von Boemcken argued that each discourse warrants 
its own critical analysis and thus should be exam-
ined separately. For example, when considering the 
first discourse, peace may not be a promising per-
spective or truth of war, as it is itself a universalist 
political project characterised by an inherent para-
dox: waging war for peace. The second discourse is an 
equally unpromising perspective, as it only offers a 
totalising image of war. Consequently, von Boemcken 
stressed the importance of confronting any single 
discourse or truth of war with its deconstruction. He 
emphasised that a critical study of war is not to dis-
cover a “hidden truth” of the phenomenon, but rather 
to highlight the multiple narratives through which 
war is continually conceptualised. He concluded by 
noting that there might be other marginalised or 
suppressed discourses of war that may disrupt con-
ventional narratives for legitimising organised vio-
lence, opening up alternative ways of critically con-
fronting the aforementioned prevailing concepts.
Security and the Future:  
The Limitations of Knowledge
Claudia Aradau, King’s College London, shifted the 
 attention from discourses of war to discourses of 
(in)security, which feature prominently in both re-
search and policy today. This discourse is commonly 
framed in the context of the future, where focus is 
placed on emerging threats and how to deal with un-
expected, unpredictable and potentially catastrophic 
events. One way to critically analyse discourses on 
(in)security is to look at how they approach the prob-
lem of knowledge—what is and is not known, and 
what can and cannot be known. Here, Aradau identi-
fied three epistemic regimes found in discourses on 
(in)security, characterising them as follows: igno-
rance and  secrecy, risk and uncertainty, and surprise 
and complexity. She outlined each in turn.
Within the regime of ignorance and secrecy, Aradau 
argued, there is an assumption that the unknown can 
be reduced and made accessible through surveillance, 
transparency, and the disclosure of secrets. Ignorance 
appears simply as a failure which can be resolved by 
better access to what is held secret, hidden, or under-
ground. Knowledge can therefore be produced by 
moving from depth to surface. Knowledge is always 
accessible and achievable despite hindrances or com-
plications. The reaction to future threats within this 
epistemology implies better intelligence or surveil-
lance and thus makes pre-emptive action possible. 
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By contrast, the regime of risk and uncertainty pro-
duces knowledge by creating a parallel world that 
simulates, models, and mimics the “real” world with 
the help of statistical and computing techniques. 
 Uncertainty is dealt with by establishing parallels be-
tween individuals and masses, or between a specific 
event and a class of events for which statistics can be 
calculated. It is a specific calculation of the future 
based on archival and statistical knowledge about  
a class of events. It underpins preventive actions di-
rected at groups that are singled out and marked by 
certain risk factors, but it does not tackle uncertainty 
at the level of the individual. 
In the regime of surprise and complexity, (in)security 
events are as always emergent and likely. Within this 
regime there is one “flat” world where surprise is in-
evitable and ever a potentiality encompassing the 
unknown as always already part of this world. The 
production of knowledge is simply innovation posit-
ing preparedness and resilience as answers to surprise 
and epistemic complexity. For confronting  future 
threats this leaves nothing more than preparedness 
as inhabiting the event. 
While several pressing issues questioning these mo-
dalities of knowledge production could and should be 
put forward, Aradau stressed that this was not the in-
tention of her argument. Rather she underlined the 
fact that we have not stepped from one to the other 
but that all three are present and in use even though 
they appear contradictory. These three regimes are 
mobilising institutions and society in large while 
their tensions are negotiated in practice. In conclu-
sion Aradau pointed out two implications of her argu-
ment: first, that critical analysis of discourses of war 
needs to consider particular epistemic formations 
and differential modes of producing knowledge in 
 relation to different unknowns; and second, that the 
issue of epistemic regimes requires us, as researchers 
and academics, to think over the ways we ourselves 
produce knowledge.
Critical Security Studies
Kai Koddenbrock, RWTH Aachen University, referred 
to BICC’s Concept Paper and highlighted the centrality 
of critical research in BICC’s work. He acknowledged 
the Paper for articulating a rather explicit compre-
hension thereof, as this is strikingly absent in most 
work in critical security studies. In his presentation, 
Koddenbrock set out to illustrate different meanings 
of being critical and altering understandings of cri-
tique by referring to influential authors such as 
Michel Foucault, Bruno Latour, Luc Boltanski, and 
Karl Marx. Yet, before going into detail on these dif-
ferent avenues he argued in favour of considering 
theory and critique as always dependent on the social 
relations it takes place in. As an important inspira-
tion for critical work, Foucault is positioned as refut-
ing a dominant social force always emphasising the 
multiple and contingent character of reality. Taken 
together, Latour and Boltanski are perceived as criti-
cising critical theory for being arrogant in assuming 
to know better about what is best for the actors that 
they write about. These authors propose to follow the 
lead of the actors in perceiving the world around 
them. However, Koddenbrock argued that through 
this perspective, a system like capitalism is rendered 
unknowable, which is unfortunate when confronted 
with an array of disturbing capitalist processes. Con-
sequently he proposed for a new critique of capital-
ism, highlighting how a focus on the “local” is in-
creasingly missing the issue of power differentials. 
Analysis in this tradition fails to acknowledge that 
global processes might have a systemic or structural 
logic that has an ontological importance of its own. 
This then leads to a relative gap when focussing on 
the relationship between conflict, war, intervention 
and capitalism. Koddenbrock recommended to ques-
tion how contemporary capitalism works and to 
translate this into the study of intervention and war. 
In this venture, he maintains that a return to Marx 
would be promising as it allows a consideration of 
material realities and the active role of the researcher 
in interpreting these relationships. Critique is then 
always a mixture of active interpretation and a thor-
ough analysis of the dynamics and history of what is 
going on in society. In pointing to current work on 
the link between practices of warfare and certain 
forms of capitalism, Koddenbrock advised that this 
could be a promising perspective to pursue further. 
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A Critique of Discourses of War
The question of how to go about a critique of dis-
courses on war was a central point of discussion. In 
light of the thoughts put forward, what are the prac-
tical consequences they impose? Are they suggestive 
of silence rather than dialogue? And what happens to 
truth? While Koddenbrock emphasized the politically 
empowering act of claiming to be able to speak some 
kind of truth, von Boemcken referred to the unre-
solved question of real political contestation that is 
non-violent. He argued for accepting the multiplici-
ties of truth and for speaking up when challenging 
legitimising discourses of organised violence. The 
concept of peace put forward by the panellists was 
also questioned by the audience, and it was noted 
Luuk van de Vondervoort (2nd l.) \ with Claudia Aradau,  
Kai Koddenbrock and Marc von Boemcken (clockwise)
that in contrast to totalising notions of peace, there 
are other conceptions that incorporate multiplicity 
and difference that may offer promising avenues for 
future research. Finally, the issue of knowledge and 
particularly hidden knowledge was taken up. While 
Aradau suggested that transparency could be an ob-
jective to pursue, this is a typical reaction that is ex-
emplary of modern thinking of knowledge. She urged 
the audience to consider trust as an important im-
perative of knowledge production. While it demon-
strates the need for new or alternative ways of pro-
ducing knowledge, it also demands that we acknowl-
edge the limitations of our own modes of research 
and advice.
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Means of Organised Violence— 
The Arms Industry
The arms industry is responsible for producing the most pervasive tools used 
for perpetrating organised violence. In this dynamic panel, arms industry 
experts Jocelyn Mawdsley, University of Newcastle, former BICC Research 
Director Michael Brzoska, University of Hamburg, and Jan Grebe, BICC, moder-
ated by Bernhard Moltmann, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, considered the 
state of the industry in Europe and Germany more specifically, pointing to signs 
of crisis and change in the years ahead.
Michael Brzoska (3rd l.) \ gave an input on the German arms industry‘s strategy
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The European Arms Industry:  
Changing State–Firm Relations
Jocelyn Mawdsley, University of Newcastle, stated as 
fact that despite the general trend of decline in de-
fence spending after the end of the Cold War, there  
is a substantial over-capacity in certain sectors of de-
fence–industrial production, as well as a low number 
of mergers between European arms industries. Eco-
nomically, European firms have become dependent 
on their revenue from arms exports. Mawdsley be-
lieves this is deeply problematic, because arms ex-
ports are a very short-term solution to a bigger prob-
lem, namely whether exports can be relied upon in 
an increasingly competitive international market. 
Along with these difficulties, Mawdsley highlighted 
emerging issues, such as new security priorities, as 
well as the shift from a closed to a more fluent securi-
ty sector structure, both of which play into the blur-
ring of internal and external security, as there is no 
longer a clear dividing line between what is civilian 
and what is military. Ultimately, all of these factors 
suggest a change in state–firm relations, though 
there is significant variation among EU Member 
States. For example, the United Kingdom and France 
are open to having closer ties and possible mergers  
of their arms industries, while Germany focusses on 
national consolidation of its arms industry. The Euro-
pean Commission as a new actor plays into this con-
fusion of aims and objectives. Overall, the interest in 
conversion is remote, though there are exceptions—
notably France. 
The German Arms Industry:  
No Clear Strategy
According to Michael Brzoska, University of Ham-
burg, there is always a crisis in the German arms 
 industry. This is underlined by the recent announce-
ments of the new German government to reduce 
arms exports. A core problem seems to be the rela-
tionship between the Ministry of Defence and the 
arms industry, which is characterised by a certain 
complicity of interests, in particular regarding the 
procurement of weapons. Brzoska sees this status fi-
nally questioned today, as Minister of Defence, Ursula 
von der Leyen, remarked that very few sections of the 
German arms industry are actually indispensable; 
hence many areas (e.g. tank/ submarine production, 
small arms) are challenged as the strategy of govern-
mental protection begins to crumble. This develop-
ment contradicts the line of policy in recent years. 
While in the wake of the end of the Cold War some 
processes of conversion were initiated, the dominant 
trend for defence companies in Germany was to 
maintain their potential for arms production, but to 
diversify in the meantime. In Brzoska’s assessment, 
the German government’s strategy is not reasonable 
in light of changing security threats and capacities of 
the Bundeswehr. At present, there are only incoherent 
ideas on how to address current security issues, 
which is why the direction of change is difficult to 
identify: Minister of Economic Affairs, Sigmar Gabriel, 
for example, argues for a reconsolidation of selected 
companies around government protection, whereas 
von der Leyen is pushing to open up industry. Brzoska 
believes a political decision on this matter is critical 
for the way forward. 
Understanding Demand  
in the Arms Industry
Jan Grebe, BICC, underlined the current trend among 
European states to maintain their country’s defence 
production capacity based on their fear of becoming 
dependent on other states. Instead of fostering Euro-
pean co-operation, states follow export strategies. 
Grebe affirmed a rise in the international arms trade 
Jocelyn Mawdsley \ with Bernhard Moltmann
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since 2001 and, in response to NATO states’ decreased 
equipment expenditures in their home markets, a 
search for new markets in Asia, Latin America, North 
Africa and especially the Middle East. In addition to 
the sale of weapons to these regions, weapons tech-
nology is also being transferred. Leading states of 
 recipient continents, that is South Korea, India or 
Turkey, are not only motivated to import, but also to 
advance their arms industries and to strive for ex-
porting their own weapons, for which technology is 
required. But rather than the sellers dominating the 
transfers, today the recipient states increasingly 
dominate the relation between seller and buyer by 
dictating the conditions for arms deals. Accordingly, 
Grebe stressed that the demand for arms and weap-
ons technology needs to be the focus of research. 
Grebe expressed concern regarding the sale of West-
ern technology to other continents, as the control 
over proliferation is sold in this process as well. In 
conclusion, future research must (1) address the tools 
of violence, that is the danger of small arms exported 
to countries where they are likely to be used to en-
danger society; (2) understand the patterns of inter-
national arms transfers; and (3) reflect on the techno-
logical basis behind arms exports. This mandate re-
fers primarily to questions of demand; in other words, 
the recipients’ interest in purchasing weapons. 
Looking to the Future
In the ensuing discussion, it was emphasised that 
the export of arms is not a zero-sum game between 
the sale of weapons and the slide into mass unem-
ployment/ poverty; rather, it can be conceived of as a 
win-win situation, and should be promoted as such. 
Mawdsley confirmed this argument by criticising 
that in the arms debate today, fallacies are often 
adopted as policy, especially at the European level—a 
fact that needs to be corrected. Grebe’s emphasis on 
the demand side was challenged, as it was comment-
ed that the defence market is not only a buyer’s mar-
ket, but also a very corrupt market, and thus research 
needs to focus on both buyer and seller. How should 
the European arms industry be structured in ten 
years? Mawdsley envisioned smaller markets and in-
creased competition, equating fewer defence firms 
consolidated in only a few European states. Brzoska 
posited that it depends on two levels of politics: the 
design of politics, that is the size of the armed forces 
in Germany/ Europe and the characterisation of mili-
tary activity as “defence” or “intervention”, as well as 
the relationship between the state and industry. In 
his opinion, further Europeanisation is most likely, 
though not necessarily on a full-scale. He emphasised 
that in the arms industry, politics and the influence 
of actors’ interests are extremely visible and power-
ful. Grebe agreed, commenting that in ten years it is 
likely that arms will still be exported based primarily 
on political considerations. Thus, the aim should be a 
“dependency among partners” with limited export 
capacities in Europe, and not—as it currently is—a 
situation in which economic pressure leads to arms 
exports and technology transfers to the Middle East. 
With regard to technology, panellists noted that the 
dominance of drones is predicted by experts and that, 
while new technologies are certainly considered, the 
importance and impact of conventional arms such  
as tanks, fighter aircraft and warships will remain, as 
illustrated by so-called Islamic State (IS) or in the 
South Chinese Sea. Brzoska and Grebe agreed that 
 reducing the export of small arms would be the most 
effective type of export reduction for global stability 
and peace. 
Owen Greene \ presented on SALW control
Jan Grebe \ focussed on EU arms exports
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Owen Greene \ presented on SALW control
Means of Organised Violence— 
Small Arms and Light Weapons 
This panel offered a unique blend of perspectives on small arms and light 
weapons (SALW) from both research and practice. Sami Faltas, University of 
Groningen, Owen Greene, University of Bradford, and Simon Yazgi, United 
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, actively discussed the pros-
pects of controlling these weapons and minimising their role in organised 
violence, moderated by Wolf-Christian Paes, BICC.
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Gun Fetishism
Sami Faltas, University of Groningen, emphasised 
that we often confuse ends with means when talking 
about guns and gun control, which can be destructive 
or dangerous. There is such a thing as gun fetishism. 
The term fetish means artefact. It was primarily 
used in religious contexts, however it can have a 
 sexual connotation and it is used in various other 
contexts where the power of a person/ divinity is as-
cribed to an object. Fetishism is a form of substitu-
tion or confusion. Faltas pointed out that guns are 
not always and exclusively regarded as the tools of 
armed violence. Most often they are seen as the em-
bodiment of certain values, such as power, virility, 
adulthood, fun, safety, but can also be simply mer-
chandise or used as a mean of obtaining food. Faltas 
argued that researchers and policymakers need to be 
aware of this diversity and to carefully inquire into 
the function of weapons to their possessors. 
There is also a fetishism of gun control. Faltas point-
ed out that if the ends and the means are confused, 
gun control mechanisms such as the Arms Trade 
Treaty (ATT) are seen as the solution, which they are 
not. Here the advocates of gun control ascribe various 
things to weapons and measures that are taken to 
regulate them. Again, researchers must guard against 
confusing ends and means, the packaging and the 
content, policy and practice, symbols and reality. 
Lessons Learned on SALW Control
Owen Greene, University of Bradford, provided a short 
account of the development of research on small 
arms that began in the mid- to late 1990s. Greene 
pointed out that usable knowledge has been accumu-
lated since then, but the last few years have been par-
ticularly fruitful. Some overall findings are that caus-
es, drivers, and characteristics of armed violence are 
highly complex, multi-factorial and dynamic. Among 
important factors affecting many relevant structures, 
actors, and dynamics of armed violence is the availa-
bility of SALW, its flows and types. 
Greene analysed the research, policy and program-
ming agendas that are implied by the term “organ-
ised violence.” The term can be divided into three 
broad categories:
 \ “Legitimate” means and use of violence by and 
for state or international authorities; 
 \ Instrumental violence by organised armed 
groups/ actors; 
 \ Socially structured violence. 
For each of these categories small arms availability, 
flows, types have distinct potential as causes, means, 
and impacts. They depend greatly on context, norms, 
governance and security provision.
Greene pointed out that there is a lot of experience 
with a variety of policies and programmes by which 
affected states and societies can reduce armed vio-
lence. However, these need to be customised based on 
a detailed understanding of the risks for and resil-
ience against armed violence in each specific country. 
Over the last decade, the challenge of local strategies, 
initiatives and programmes for armed violence re-
duction and SALW control changed from developing 
international agreements, norms, mechanisms and 
resources, to a supply/ demand matchmaking chal-
lenge, where poor links with security sector reform 
(SSR) and disarmament, demobilisation and reinte-
gration (DDR) programmes, coupled with governance 
issues, a short-termism and inflexibility of the pro-
grammes and the donors are the major hindrances. 
Sami Faltas \ presented on gun fetishism
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Applied research is required to overcome these chal-
lenges. Greene pointed out that applied research and 
policy challenges should focus on five main clusters 
of international co-operation regimes to address 
SALW control and armed violence reduction (AVR) 
challenges: 
 \ Aiding conflict-affected and “post-conflict” 
countries;
 \ Eliciting and responding to requests from 
 fragile or severely affected countries;
 \ Promoting and ensuring adequate national 
controls on all aspects of SALW and AVR; 
 \ Co-operation and support to prevent and tackle 
illicit/ unauthorised SALW cross-border flows 
of SALW and “organisers of armed violence”;
 \ Integration of AVR and SALW control into wid-
er development programmes and processes.
Experience from the Field 
Simon Yazgi, United Nations Department of Peace-
keeping Operations, brought the practitioners’ per-
spective into the debate. The United Nations has been 
involved in DDR for 25 years, starting in Latin Ameri-
ca in 1989. Since then, DDR programmes have become 
a standard tool of UN peacekeeping and have been 
 included in most of the newly mandated operations 
deployed by the organisation.
Traditionally, a DDR programme is composed of the 
following steps: After a conflict, the conflict parties 
agree on a peace agreement. Within that peace agree-
ment there are provisions for a DDR programme. The 
conflict parties have agreed to give up their guns and 
to pursue their goals through political or other means. 
The combatants are then disarmed and provided with 
civilian clothing, and sometimes money before they 
are “reintegrated.” A detailed/ elaborated compilation 
of the policies, the practices and the guidelines of in-
tegrated disarmament, demobilisation and reintegra-
tion standards (IDDRS) was published in 2006.1
Yazgi explained that, unfortunately, the context in 
which DDR operations are deployed nowadays has 
since changed. The United Nations tries to run DDR 
operations in environments that are no longer peace-
keeping environments, but rather active conflicts. 
This means that the DDR officers have little political 
leverage over the parties and, since they have not 
agreed to anything, there is nothing the officers can 
hold the parties accountable for. Moreover, the DDR 
target groups have changed, too. As most of the con-
flicts are internal conflicts, several more or less disci-
plined armed groups, sometimes up to 5,000, can 
 exist in a conflict. Some of the groups may be local 
defence groups, others terrorist organisations, others 
join simply for mercenary outfits, few will have a po-
litical motivation, and many will have links to organ-
ised crime. 
The structure of these groups also makes it difficult 
to find out who is in command and control, and to get 
in contact with the people the DDR officers need to 
talk to do their jobs. Also, the line between civilians 
and conflict forces are blurred. Moreover, Yazgi 
stressed, insecurity is a growing problem, and by 
some the United Nations is now seen as a “legitimate” 
target. While the solutions to these problems have 
not yet been found, the relevant questions to ask are 
known, and the goal of answering them is set.
Simon Yazgi (r.) \ and Wolf-Christian Paes 1 \  http://unddr.org/iddrs-framework.aspx
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Berit Bliesemann de Guevara \ and Tobias Debiel
Practices and Narratives of Organised  
Violence—Warlords, Knowledge Producers  
and Reputation
This panel focussed on the crucial role of researchers and institutions in pro-
ducing certain narratives about conflicts. Antonio Giustozzi, King’s College 
London, William Reno, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, and Berit 
Bliesemann de Guevara, Aberystwyth University, Wales, provided insights on 
this process from their fieldwork in various parts of the world, moderated by 
Tobias Debiel, INEF, Duisburg.
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Remobilisation and Lessons  
Learned from Afghanistan
Antonio Giustozzi, King’s College London, analysed 
the internal and external factors that led to the remo-
bilisation in Afghanistan after the international com-
munity announced its withdrawal. The official UN-
led disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
(DDR) process between 2003 and 2005 had been a fail-
ure, partly because it had started two years after the 
official end of the Afghanistan war in 2001. By this 
point, military groups had already converted into 
 mafias, gangs and smugglers who had no political 
motivation to fight a civil war. By consequence, the 
UN DDR programme even “demobilised” young men 
who had never fought a war. Due to the inadequate 
disarmament process, the circulation of automatic 
weapons was really high in the aftermath of the 
 conflict, but outright violence was remarkably low in 
 Afghanistan. Giustozzi highlighted the point that a 
high fluctuation of weapons does not necessarily 
mean a threat to the state or its population.
The situation in Afghanistan changed significantly 
with President Obama’s 2011 announcement to with-
draw all United States forces by the end of 2014. Gius-
tozzi explained that, with little faith in the Afghan 
army to protect them and their interests after the 
withdrawal of the international military presence, 
some old civil war players, but also some new players 
began to remobilise. A fear of the Taliban was also 
shared by other foreign powers, such as India. Howev-
er, another reason for the unofficial mobilisation of 
militias and armed groups was—in the near absence 
of political opposition—their perceived need to de-
fend their interests against one another. Despite their 
different structures and degree of organisation, all 
groups were unified in their need for weapons. Dur-
ing the previous ten years, many of the weapons had 
been sold on the black market, broke down or were 
simply kept at home. In response, remobilised groups 
either started to buy weapons on the black market or 
to find foreign states that would provide them with 
weapons and ammunition. Over the past few years, 
external funding and support has helped the remobi-
lisation of groups. 
Giustozzi concluded by highlighting the big picture 
of organising for war and the small picture of weap-
ons proliferation, which often diverge. A high prolif-
eration of weapons in a country can lead to different 
outcomes. Thus he further stressed that any DDR pro-
gramme, which is not embedded in a larger political 
framework, is simply meaningless, as the stock of ex-
ternal funding and that of human resources that can 
be mobilised is nearly endless. 
The Influence of Global Narratives  
on Armed Groups and Practices
William Reno, Northwestern University, argued that 
global narratives influence what kind of struggle is 
seen as legitimate by the international community. 
Although at the beginning of a conflict, it is possible 
for various sorts of armed groups to emerge, the lead-
ers and groups that take hold are those who are able 
to respond to the global narrative. In turn, these 
groups enjoy better access to international resources. 
While people join armed groups for very different 
reasons, every armed group passes through a process 
of assimilation, during the course of which all moti-
vations are crunched together into the narrative. In 
addition, by legitimatising certain struggles, global 
narratives also determine which armed groups deserve 
to be supported by the international community. 
Reno illustrated his argument using the example of 
Charles Taylor, who, by trying to leverage a narrative 
of himself as the liberator of Liberia, responded to the 
then predominant liberation war narrative, which had 
accepted fights against colonial rulers and against 
apartheid as legitimate struggles of the time. Taylor 
thereby tried not only to gain access to material 
 resources but also a voice in international politics. 
However, the global narrative changed from the liber-
ation war narrative towards the criminal war narra-
tive, to which Taylor struggled to adapt. 
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The criminal war narrative delegitimised rebellions 
and portrayed armed conflicts as something that can 
be managed since the international community pos-
sesses the right tools: sanctions, truth commissions, 
prosecution, peace negotiations. Spoilers were able to 
be identified, and peace was seen as a restoration of 
the status before the war. Armed actors were impact-
ed by and reacted differently to this notion and the 
tools. While peace negotiations were sometimes seen 
as incentives for groups to split, so that subordinates 
could also be included in the process, sanctions shaped 
the resources that each armed group would get. 
Over the last years, Reno argued that a new global 
narrative has emerged, which does not accept some 
of the foundations of the criminal war narrative: 
firstly, there has been a shift away from the norm of 
no conquest; and secondly, there has been the shift 
away from the idea that all territory needs to be occu-
pied by states. A third development, which explains 
the emergence of the new narrative, is the phenome-
non of state collapse, which was previously experi-
enced only in African countries, but which has spread 
to the Middle East as of 2011. Faced with the failure of 
the project state, many of the fighting groups in this 
region seem to be in search of adequate narratives 
and to figure out what they are fighting for. In a simi-
lar vein, this new narrative has created uncertainty in 
the international community with whom to support. 
Reno suggested that BICC could engage in this debate 
by offering concrete ideas about this new narrative, 
about whom to support and about the connection 
 between Western values and their impact on violent 
conflicts. 
The Influence of Interpreters  
and Interpretations  
of Organised Violence
Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, Aberystwyth Universi-
ty, Wales, looked into practices of producing knowl-
edge about violence and conflict. In line with Reno, 
she argued that although conflicts take place in a lo-
cal context, they all have a transnational dimension. 
Very often, local violence is categorised and evaluated 
through international observers—our interpretations 
of the conflict. This process bestows legitimacy on 
certain actors while delegitimising others. Some in-
terpretations, such as those produced by internation-
al institutions like the International Crisis Group 
(ICG), tend to propagate the belief that analysts or ob-
servers can assume an “outsider position” and identi-
fy clear problems and appropriate policy recommen-
dations. Bliesemann de Guevara, however, argued that 
anyone who engages in the construction of knowl-
edge about a conflict is part of the conflict as such. 
While the problems start with diverging realities felt 
by people involved in the conflict, she also highlight-
ed the danger for analysts to be instrumentalised by 
all sides of the conflict. This holds especially true for 
organisations like the ICG that strongly relies on field 
research and social relationships. In addition, Bliese-
mann de Guevara highlighted the process of simplifi-
cation that takes place, for example when the ICG 
translates their detailed and rich analyses into clear 
policy recommendations. While she deems this sim-
plification as necessary, policy recommendations are 
only taken up if they fit into compatible narratives 
that are already out there. She therefore maintained 
that organisations like the ICG, but also BICC, need to 
be aware of these shortcomings and to remain cog-
nisant about which complexities are being left out in 
their analysis, and what consequences this might 
have for whom. 
William Reno (l.) \ with Berit Bliesemann de Guevara, Tobias Debiel and  
Antonio Giustozzi (l. t. r.)
Antonio Giustozzi (r.) \ debating after the panel
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The Relationship between  
Producing Knowledge and the Practice 
of Organised Violence
In the discussion period, Reno admitted that political 
scientists face a similar problem to advocacy groups, 
because they are interested mainly in linear causality 
and so have to leave out a great deal when analysing  
a conflict. In turn, they often generate non-false con-
clusions that are not very operative or interesting. 
With regard to Reno’s presentation on narratives, 
 Giustozzi acknowledged that in the long-term the 
 declining narrative of state unity could affect the in-
tegrity of Afghanistan in a negative way as well as the 
declining narrative of centralised insurgency groups 
when these decentralised groups take over the gov-
ernment. Referring to Bliesemann de Guevara’s find-
ings on the ICG, the discussion mainly centred on the 
question of how academic research, especially field 
research, can be improved. Suggestions included to 
actually live “in the field” instead of conducting short 
research trips, to use an anthropological approach to 
research, to include more local researchers in the pro-
cess, and to engage more with the local population 
instead of focussing on political stakeholders. Never-
theless, it was highlighted that the relationship be-
tween the production of knowledge and practices of 
organised violence is interdependent, as violence can 
also highly restrict and influence the production of 
knowledge. Furthermore, it was proposed to increase 
transparency about which information is being left 
out, and to decrease the period between the collection 
of data and its publication.
Antonio Giustozzi (r.) \ debating after the panel
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Intersecting Themes of Organised Violence
Natural resources and migration are closely related to organised violence, 
sometimes as manifestations of discourses of organised violence, but also as 
means and practices of organised violence. In this way, they are intersecting 
themes of research at BICC. In this panel, Benedikt Korf, University of Zurich, 
and Paula Banerjee, Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group, gave two highly 
provocative and engaging presentations, forcing audience members to question 
their own approaches to conducting research on these themes. The discussion 
was moderated by Adolf Kloke-Lesch, German Development Institute, Bonn.
Paula Banerjee (l.) \  with Adolf Kloke-Lesch and Benedikt Korf (l. t. r.)
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Climate Change and  
“Environmental Orthodoxy”
Benedikt Korf, University of Zurich, challenged the 
view that scarcity and abundance of natural resources, 
be they influenced by climate change, demographic 
growth or other factors, lead to violent conflict. He 
highlighted the importance of field research to chal-
lenge the correlations presented by many quantita-
tive studies that climate change enhances mecha-
nisms that trigger violence and insecurity. According 
to Korf, this idea is flawed and amounts to “environ-
mental orthodoxy.” Instead of adhering to this ortho-
doxy, Korf recommends using Tim Forsyth’s approach 
of looking at the field to shed light on the missing 
links that can explain the mechanisms between the 
environment and conflict. These explanations could 
then confront the “causal stories” that are often made 
up to explain any correlations. 
Nevertheless, the myth of an apocalyptical future 
 remains strong. Influential books such as The coming 
 anarchy by Robert D. Kaplan link population growth, 
resource scarcity and mass violence. Collapse by 
Jared Diamond associates environmental stress and 
overpopulation to political stress and predicts an 
apocalyptical future in which people will struggle 
over scarce resources. As the climate gets hotter, the 
argument goes, scarcity will increase especially in 
places that are already less developed, leading to more 
violence. Homer-Dixon presents an institutionally 
softened version of these causalities. In Environment, 
Scarcity and Conflict, he presents the view that insti-
tutions can adapt to stress, albeit not in poorly gov-
erned countries. 
What is problematic is that scholars take actual cases 
of conflict and use them as real life laboratories in 
which the future can be anticipated. For example, in 
places like Darfur or Somalia, Korf argued that a nar-
rative of violent struggle over scarce resources has 
materialised. In Harad Welzer’s Klimakriege (“climate 
wars”), the Darfur conflict is presented as a conflict 
resulting from scarcity. Resource scarcity caused 
stress between pastoralists and peasants. Coupled 
with desperation and forced displacement, the result 
was violent conflict over the few remaining resources. 
This reading of the Darfur conflict in particular is in 
line with Kaplan’s view presented in his book, Col-
lapse. However, other research (Kevane & Grey, 20082) 
has shown that rainfall patterns in Darfur do not co-
incide with the conflict events in the way presented 
by the scarcity narrative. More specifically, violent 
conflict occurred during wet periods rather than dur-
ing periods of drought in Darfur, so water scarcity 
was not a trigger. In addition, Turner (20043) rejects 
the notion of a clash of civilisation between peasants 
and pastoralists, because these groups have co-existed 
for ages and have their own mechanisms in place to 
de-escalate tensions. Any failure of these mecha-
nisms in the more recent past would have had more 
to do with geopolitics, and not resource scarcity.  
Also, if the Darfur conflict was a struggle over scarce 
resources, why would Arab militias be burning 
everything, destroying the very resources they alleg-
edly needed? 
2 \  Darfur: Rainfall and conflict. Environmental Research Letters 3 (3).
3 \  Political ecology and the moral dimensions of “resource conflicts”: 
the case of farmer–herder conflicts in the Sahel. Political Geography, 23, 
863–889.
Benedikt Korf \ presented on climate change
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Korf turned to another example, the Sahel conflict 
constellation, where environmental stress coupled 
with a social crisis in already weak states is believed 
to have caused civil war. In fact, this constellation has 
led to violence in some instances, but has also led to 
collaboration in others. While scarcity is normally 
not the trigger for violence, it is still a powerful dis-
course that frames the debates on causes of organised 
violence. This discourse continues to shape our ideas 
of governance. However, for Korf, the apocalyptic fu-
tures presented by the abovementioned authors are 
imagined. What we should actually be afraid of, he ar-
gued, is a climate Leviathan; a paradigm of security 
as normal governance. 
In the ensuing discussion, Korf emphasised that, 
while there are some links between resources and 
conflict, most studies and publications are primarily 
concerned with proving a link between scarcity/ 
abundance and conflict. When these studies find 
some correlation between the two variables, they 
present a story of causality. The media often takes up 
this story, leading to the environmental orthodoxy of 
climate change leading to wars. This is then used to 
justify the protection of our security by means such 
as Frontex. Missing, however, are the explanatory 
 variables and mechanisms that can only be found by 
conducting field research, and that may present a 
very different story. Critical analysis of this dominant 
discourse would require field research to counter this 
story, but it would also need to question how this 
form of orthodoxy is produced, and what other ave-
nues of knowledge production are possible. 
Borders, Migration  
and Organised Violence
Referring to the example of the Indo–Bangladesh 
border, Paula Banerjee, Mahanirban Calcutta Re-
search Group, discussed the phenomenon of how a 
state creates an enemy area and how a refugee prob-
lem becomes a security problem. Looking back at the 
history since the partition of India and Pakistan in 
1947, and at many other instances of border creation 
in former colonies, Banerjee takes the creation of bor-
ders as the starting point for violence. Initially, the 
border was drawn arbitrarily within six weeks. It ran 
amidst villages, even amidst houses. Fields were di-
vided. For the people living in the border area, coex-
isting with the marked and fenced borders is difficult. 
In the case of India, partition meant the forceful 
movement of populations, abductions and killings. 
Over time, immigration policies have changed in 
 India. While formerly, Tibetans were given an acre of 
land upon arrival, they are less welcome now, not giv-
en land and moved around. In the region, Pakistan 
has the most refugees. Continuous migration means 
continuous violence. 
Since the age of terrorism, Banerjee affirmed that mi-
gration has become a contentious issue. The alien is 
the body of the migrant. He is seen as a threat to the 
state. The border, then, becomes a matter of national 
security, which is concerned with the land and no 
longer with people. By crossing the land, the migrant 
is committing an act of subversion and becomes a 
suspect. Undocumented migrants are seen as terror-
ists, possible agents of so-called Islamic State (IS). The 
discourse on the numbers of migrants is inflated, 
 especially during times of election. Refugees in this 
area face a tremendous amount of violence, though 
there is little interest in or public attention on this is-
sue. External donors are far more interested in issues 
of human trafficking, especially mapping trafficking 
routes to Europe. There is a fear of uncontrollable 
population movements. This is also linked to uncon-
trolled sexuality of women that threatens to destroy 
the morality of the country. What is needed, Banerjee 
concluded, is cross-country, transnational research.
Claudia Aradau (r.) \ with Herbert Wulf, Conrad Schetter, Kees Kingma  
and Tilman Brück (r. t. l.)
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Closing Panel: 
Reflections on  Current Challenges of  
Peace and Conflict
In the closing panel, BICC Director for Research, Conrad Schetter, summarised 
four prominent questions that arose from the conference and invited founding 
Director of BICC, Herbert Wulf, Claudia Aradau, King’s College London, Tilman 
Brück, former Director of SIPRI, and Kees Kingma, Independent Consultant, to 
provide their input.
Claudia Aradau (r.) \ with Herbert Wulf, Conrad Schetter, Kees Kingma  
and Tilman Brück (r. t. l.)
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The following four questions were raised by the con-
ference, and have implications for how BICC carries 
out its work in the future:
 \ Is it possible for research to be critical on the 
one hand, and policy relevant on the other? If 
so, how can we shape our work to be both 
things? 
 \ How can research differentiate between, and 
focus on what we can know, versus what we 
cannot know? How should we deal with what 
we cannot know?
 \ What is organised violence, and what is it not? 
 \ Does classical base conversion research still 
matter? Should BICC continue to work on base 
conversion in the future, or is this type of con-
version no longer relevant?
Herbert Wulf affirmed that there are many areas 
where research is still needed on classical conversion. 
For example, military base conversion, which is the 
core of classical conversion research, continues to 
face some resistance within Germany at the local lev-
el. Why is this so? What dynamics are at play? Wulf 
also highlighted the problem of industrial conver-
sion, as some major weapons producers are building 
up their defence production capacities rather than 
exploring alternative ones. Conversion of the defence 
industry takes a long time, he observed, and the best 
way to promote it needs more understanding. 
With regard to somewhat less classical understand-
ings of conversion, Wulf argued that research is still 
needed on a number of unfulfilled goals, such as the 
conversion of “swords into ploughshares”—that is the 
conversion of military weapons and technologies to 
civilian assets—and the conversion of military spend-
ing, which has seen an increase over the past years. 
He also highlighted the need to examine how armed 
groups and militias like IS can be demobilised once 
defeated, which is also a form of conversion. Wulf 
nevertheless underlined the importance of research 
beyond conversion to examine the causes of conflict, 
in order to be able to avoid mistakes from the past. He 
observed that the term “security” is now preferred to 
“conflict prevention”, yet the aim of promoting secu-
rity is not clear and too often interpreted as military 
action. This interpretation should be questioned and 
critiqued, he argued, and the securitisation of large 
parts of our society should be examined for any con-
version potential.
Claudia Aradau emphasised that being critical in 
 research implies an understanding of the limits of 
the work that we do. She suggested that being critical 
requires constant reflection, a consideration of what 
we can know amid so many unknowns, recognising 
that there are always limits, blind spots, omissions, 
and contexts that we need to contend with. Aradau 
advised that being critical, unravelling gaps and blind 
spots, can be used to offer policy-relevant advice, be-
cause it allows us to identify and ask different ques-
tions, to reframe the research that we do. More specif-
ically, it allows us to reflect on whether policymakers 
are asking the right questions to begin with, and how 
different questions may lead to alternatives perspec-
tives and pathways.
Herbert Wulf \ Founding Director of BICC
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 Tilman Brück supported the need for a transdiscipli-
nary approach to examining organised violence. He 
stressed that there is a risk of considering only ex-
pressions of violence and their consequences, and not 
the dynamics that are involved in organising it. This 
often happens when violence is examined from a 
particular perspective, for example economics or con-
flict studies, which tends to consider only the moti-
vations, costs and consequences of violence. Brück 
suggested that one could instead ask how any one 
discipline would approach the problem of organised 
violence, and to use the insights of many different 
disciplines in trying to understand the phenomenon. 
For example, he noted that missing from most per-
spectives to date is a focus on the individuals—what 
do the citizens think? Are they free of fear? Do they 
feel secure? How do their feelings and perceptions af-
fect their behaviour? Brück suggested that behaviour-
al psychology could offer an interesting perspective 
and cover gaps that we currently have about organ-
ised violence at the micro-level. 
Kees Kingma stressed the importance of basing our 
research and/ or policy advice on an actual problem 
rather than generalised standards, such as in the case 
of disarmament, demobilization and reingration 
(DDR) programmes. He noted that one of the strengths 
of peace research is that it can be proactive and point 
to problems rather than follow “hot” news items. 
With regard to the link between critical research and 
policy advice, Kingma cautioned not to get, or to be 
perceived as getting, too close to a certain govern-
ment or donor, as this could compromise one’s posi-
tion and reputation. Keeping such distance is a con-
stant struggle, but one that must be consciously ne-
gotiated. Kingma  advised BICC to practically bridge 
the gap between research and policy by facilitating 
discourse, capacity building, evaluations and pro-
gramme reviews for practitioner institutions. 
On the thematic front, BICC was encouraged by all 
panellists to aim for analytical clarity on our use of 
the term “organised violence”, but not to get too mired 
in defining it. Aradau commended BICC for putting 
violence, rather than security, at the forefront of our 
work, as this shift opens up the possibility for new 
questions to be asked, and new answers to be found. 
The term “security” closes this debate, she added, as it 
is strongly connoted to a friend/ enemy paradigm. 
 Violence, on the other hand, allows an examination 
of how societies are organised—according to which 
principles, norms, and values?—which may help to 
shift the discussion on conflict in a different direction.
Tilman Brück (l.) \ and Kees Kingma
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